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Abstract—We propose a new defense mechanism against un-
detected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems.
To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that
monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense mech-
anisms that seek to detect infiltration, the proposed approach
seeks to minimize the damage of possible attacks before they
have been detected. Controller of a cyber-physical system could
have been infiltrated into by an undetected attacker at any time
of the operation. Disregarding such a possibility and disclosing
system’s state without caution benefits the attacker in his/her
malicious objective. Therefore, secure sensor design can improve
the security of cyber-physical systems further when incorporated
along with other defense mechanisms. We, specifically, consider
a controlled Gauss-Markov process, where the controller could
have been infiltrated into at any time within the system’s oper-
ation. In the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium,
we provide a semi-definite programming based algorithm to
compute the optimal linear secure sensor outputs and analyze
the performance for various scenarios numerically.
Index Terms—Stackelberg games, Stochastic control, Cyber-
physical systems, Security, Advanced persistent threats, Sensor
design, Semi-definite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBER-PHYSICAL systems, incorporating both physicaland cyber parts, e.g., process control systems, robotics,
smart grid, and autonomous vehicles, have resulted in new and
distinct challenges for control system design, e.g., specifically,
security-related challenges due to cyber attacks [1], [2]. Dif-
ferent from external random disturbances, cyber attacks can
be very target specific and persistent by attacking stealthily
for long term benefits. Recently in 2014, cyber-physical,
e.g., process control, systems in energy and pharmaceutical
industries have been infiltrated into by Dragonfly Malware,
which intervened in the systems over a long period of time
without being detected [3]. However, isolation from the cyber
networks are also not perfectly sufficient any more. In 2010,
StuxNet Worm caused substantial damage on certain “isolated”
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
[4]. Therefore, developing novel formal security mechanisms
against advanced and persistent threats that can cause sub-
stantial damage without being detected plays a vital role in
the security of cyber-physical systems.
Beyond exploiting uncertainties in the systems, e.g., due
to random disturbances, advanced and persistent attackers can
also seek to deceive the detection mechanisms by manipulating
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monitoring signals used by the detectors. For example, in [5],
the authors have introduced false data injection attacks, where
the attackers can inject data into the sensor outputs, in the con-
text of state estimation, and characterized undetectable attacks.
Based on the deceptive attacker model in [5], the existing
studies mainly focus on characterizing the vulnerabilities of
control systems against such undetectable attacks (which can
deceive the detectors) and designing counter measures to be
able to detect them.
In discrete-time linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) systems,
in [6], the authors have introduced replay attacks and proposed
a defense mechanism against such attacks. Replay attacks take
place during the steady state of the system, and the attacker
records and replays the sensor outputs so that the detectors
using those signals cannot detect any anomalies. Note that
the signals are expected to be similar at steady state. As a
defense mechanism, the authors have proposed to inject an
independent signal into the control input to detect such attacks
in the expense of degraded control performance. An optimal
defense strategy with respect to the probability of detection
has been formulated in [7]. Again in LQG systems, in [8], the
same set of authors have introduced integrity attacks, where
the attacker can inject data into sensor outputs and control
inputs, and characterized the reachable set that the attacker
can drive the system to without being detected (via innovation
based failure detectors [9]). They have also provided necessary
conditions for unbounded reachable set, i.e., conditions where
the attacker can destabilize the system.
Within deterministic control scenarios, in [10], the authors
have analyzed zero-dynamics attacks that do not depend
on online information, i.e., open-loop stealthy attacks, and
provided an algorithm to reveal all such attacks by adding
new measurements, similar to [6]. Again within deterministic
control scenarios, in [11], the authors have provided a uni-
fied framework for false data injection and replay attacks,
and formulated the limitations of monitoring-based detection
mechanisms. In [12], the authors have analyzed tolerance of
control systems to false data injection attacks on a subset of
sensors in the deterministic settings and proposed decoding
schemes to estimate the state via corrupted measurements.
They have also introduced a secure control loop that can
enhance the decoding performance and, correspondingly, the
resilience of the system.
The attackers can also have adversarial control objectives.
In [13], [14], the authors have analyzed such attacks, where the
attacker both seeks to be undetected and drive the state of the
system according to his/her adversarial goal by manipulating
both sensor outputs and control inputs together. Recently,
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2[15] has analyzed optimal attack strategies to maximize the
quadratic cost of a system with linear Gaussian dynamics
without being detected, where the stealthiness is measured in
terms of the Kullback-Leibler distance between the realized
and the desired state behaviors. In the optimal attack, the
attacker injects independent Gaussian noise having certain
variance into the control input. In another recent study [16],
the authors have proposed linear encoding schemes for sensor
outputs of an LQG system in order to enhance detectability of
false data injection attacks while the coding matrix is assumed
to be unknown by the attackers, which can be mitigated
via time-varying coding matrices. In spite of these extensive
studies, we still have significant and yet unexplored problems
about how to enhance security against undetected attacks, i.e.,
impact of attacks before detection.
In this paper, we address primarily the following two
questions: “If we have already designed the sensor outputs,
to what extent would we have secured the system against
undetected infiltration into the controllers?” Further, “what
would be the best linear sensor outputs that can lead to
both minimum impact and minimum damage on the ordinary
operations of the systems?” The damage due to inconspicuous
(undetectable, or difficult to detect) attacks with long term
control objectives is our main concern in this paper. We can
classify such attacks as “advanced and persistent threats”,
since they are advanced by being very target specific and
persistent by being inconspicuous. Therefore, we propose to be
cautious while disclosing the state information to the controller
due to the possibility of undetected infiltration. However,
as a system designer, we should not take precautions as if
the cyber part of the system is compromised due to just a
possibility, since that would impact the ordinary operations of
the system substantially. Combining these seemingly opposing
goals all together, we seek to design sensor outputs cautiously
with minimum impact and minimum damage on the system’s
operations.
To obtain explicit results, we specifically consider systems
with linear Gaussian dynamics and quadratic control objec-
tives, which have various applications in industry [15] from
manufacturing processes to aerospace control. We consider the
possibility of infiltration into the controller of the system by
various attackers at any stage within the time horizon. The at-
tackers have long term control objectives and attack stealthily.
To this end, they include soft constraints on the energy of the
state and the deviation of the constructed control inputs from
system-desired ones, which would have been constructed if the
attacker rather had a friendly objective. Such constraints are,
especially, against the detection mechanisms that take actions
when such deviations exceed certain thresholds.
We note that the sensors could also be infiltrated into by
the attackers, which can cancel the proposed approach via a
shortcut to the state if the sensors have access to the state
realizations. To mitigate that, we consider the scenarios where
the sensors do not have access to the actual state realizations.
All the sensor strategies, defining the relation between the state
and the sensor output, are selected beforehand to minimize
the expected loss and fixed (can be time-variant, yet not
controlled) during the operation. Therefore, we can design
the sensor outputs off-line, i.e., in advance, which leads to
a hierarchical structure between the sensor and the controller
of the system (even when he/she is adversarial).
Due to the stochastic nature of the problem, i.e., due to
the state noise, any open-loop control strategy of an attacker
could not drive the system in his/her desired path effectively
[17]. Therefore, regardless of whether the controller has an
adversarial objective or not, he/she needs to construct a closed-
loop control input based on the designed sensor outputs while
knowing the relationship between the sensor output and the
state. This implies that the interaction between the sensor and
the controller of the system could be analyzed as a game-
theoretic hierarchical equilibrium, where the sensor leads the
game by announcing his/her strategies beforehand. Therefore,
while designing the sensor outputs, we should consider both
adversarial and friendly control outputs and the possibility of
infiltration over the time horizon.
Particularly, we seek to formulate the best linear sensor
strategies for controlled Gauss-Markov processes. We consider
a different time scale for the infiltration into the system and
we formulate the optimal sensor strategies in a Bayesian
setting based on given infiltration statistics. Note that since
the sensor strategies are set to be linear, the problem is
an LQG control problem and correspondingly the optimal,
friendly, control policy is linear in the conditional estimate
of the state given all the sensor outputs. We first compute
the best control inputs of friendly and adversarial controllers
for any given linear sensor strategies and any time when they
become in charge of the controller. Corresponding to these
optimal strategies, we provide a semi-definite programming
(SDP) based algorithm to design the optimal (memoryless)
linear secure sensor strategies. Furthermore, we analyze the
sensitivity of the design against inaccurate perception of the
underlying statistics numerically. We note that in [18], we
have introduced secure sensor design against advanced and
persistent threats in cyber-physical systems, but have not
completely solved the problem. Here, we consider different
attack models that have soft constraints on the energy of the
state and the deviation of the constructed control inputs from
the system-desired ones, and we consider more comprehensive
scenarios, where the controller can be infiltrated into or an
adversarial infiltration could be detected at any time within
the time horizon.
In the design of secure cyber-physical systems, each addi-
tional security layer leads to new monetary and computational
costs [19]. In particular, there are fundamental trade-offs in
terms of investment on the security mechanisms and the value
of the protected assets or securing the system and maintaining
the ordinary operations. In order to offer better trade-offs, we
aim to propose a defense mechanism that does not require any
additional online computational load with minimum impact
and minimum damage on the ordinary operations of the
system. To summarize, we can list the main contributions of
this paper as follows:
• We introduce secure sensor design against various in-
conspicuous attackers with control objectives, which can
infiltrate into the controller of a cyber-physical system at
any time during the operation.
3• Given any linear sensor strategies and the underlying
linear quadratic Gaussian dynamics, we compute the
optimal attack strategies depending on the infiltration
time.
• We provide a practical algorithm to compute the optimal
linear memoryless sensor strategies in the sense of game-
theoretic hierarchical equilibrium.
• We also analyze sensitivity of the proposed algorithm
against inaccurate perception of attack statistics.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
provide the secure sensor design framework. In Section III,
we formulate the associated multi-stage Bayesian Stackelberg
game. In Section IV, we characterize the optimal controller
response strategies for given sensor strategies. We compute
the corresponding optimal sensor strategies in Section V. In
Section VI, we examine the performance of the proposed
scheme under various scenarios numerically. We conclude
the paper in Section VII with several remarks and possible
research directions.
Notations: For an ordered set of parameters, e.g., x1, · · · ,xn,
we define x[k,l] := xk, · · · ,xl , where 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ n. N(0, .)
denotes the multivariate Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and designated covariance. We denote random variables by
bold lower case letters, e.g., x. For a random variable x, xˆ is
another random variable corresponding to its posterior belief
conditioned on certain other random variables that will be
apparent from the context. For a vector x and a matrix A, x′ and
A′ denote their transposes, and ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean (L2)
norm of the vector x. For a matrix A, tr{A} denotes its trace.
We denote the identity and zero matrices with the associated
dimensions by I and O, respectively, while 1 (or 0) denotes a
vector whose entries are all 1 (or 0). For positive semi-definite
matrices A and B, A  B means that A−B is also a positive
semi-definite matrix. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product of
the matrices A and B.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a controlled stochastic system described by the
following equations:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +vk, (1)
yk = Duk +wk, (2)
for k = 1,2, . . . ,n, where1 A ∈ Rm×m, B ∈ Rm×r, D ∈ Rr×r,
and xk ∼N(0,Σk), k = 1, . . . ,n. The additive state and control
input noise sequences {vk} and {wk} are white Gaussian
vector processes, i.e., vk ∼N(0,Σv) and wk ∼N(0,Σw); and are
independent of the initial state x1 and of each other. We assume
that the matrix A is non-singular, and the auto-covariance
matrices Σ1 and Σv are positive definite while Σw is positive
semi-definite. The closed loop control vector uk ∈Rr is given
by
uk = γk(s[1,k]), (3)
1Even though we consider time invariant matrices A,B, and D for notational
simplicity, the provided results could be extended to time-variant cases rather
routinely. Furthermore, we consider all the random parameters to have zero
mean; however, the derivations can be extended to non-zero mean case in a
straight-forward way.
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Fig. 1: Cyber physical system including a sensor and a
controller.
where γk(·) can be any Borel measurable function from Rmk
to Rr. The sensor output sk ∈ Rm is given by
sk = ηk(xk), (4)
where ηk(·) can be any linear function from Rm to Rm. And
yk ∈ Rr, given by (2), denotes the noisy observation of the
control input uk.
We have two separate agents: Sensor (S) and Controller
(C). At each stage k = 1, . . . ,n, the agents construct sk and
uk according to their own objectives. In particular, S chooses
ηk(·) from the strategy space ϒ, which, for each k, is the
set of all linear functions from Rm to Rm, i.e., ηk ∈ ϒ and
sk = ηk(xk). This implies that for each ηk ∈ ϒ, there exists a
matrix Lk ∈ Rm×m such that
sk =L ′kxk, (5)
almost surely on Rm. C chooses γk(·) from the strategy space
Γk, which is the set of all Borel measurable functions from
Rmk to Rr, i.e., γk ∈ Γk and uk = γk(s[1,k]).
Sensor and Controller Objective. As in a stochastic control
scenario [17], S and C can have a common finite horizon2
quadratic cost function:
JF(η[1,n];γ[1,n]) = E
{
n
∑
k=1
‖xk+1‖2QF +‖uk‖2RF
}
, (6)
where3 QF ∈ Rm×m is positive semi-definite and RF ∈ Rr×r
is positive definite. Note that uk = γk(s[1,k]) while sk = ηk(xk)
almost surely. Correspondingly, S could disclose the state xk
directly so that C could drive the state in their commonly
desired path [17], [20]. However, in a cyber physical system,
the system is vulnerable to adversarial infiltration attacks that
seek to drive the state of the system away from the system’s
desired target as seen in Fig. 1. We call such attacks “advanced
persistent threats”, which are advanced by being very target
specific, i.e., the attacker knows the underlying state recursion,
2E.g., horizon length is n.
3For notational simplicity, we consider time-invariant QF and RF. However,
the provided results could be extended to time-variant cases rather routinely.
4and persistent by avoiding infiltration detection. Therefore, S,
i.e., the sensor designer, should anticipate the likelihood of
adversarial infiltration into C, i.e., the possibility that C can
be an adversary, and select ηk ∈ ϒ accordingly.
Remark 1. We note that the sensor output sk only depends
on the current state xk, i.e., ηk is memoryless. Otherwise, S
would need to have access to the state information in order to
store and to be able to use them in the future stages. However,
similar to C, S can also be infiltrated into by the attackers,
which would neutralize S’s effort to design sensor outputs
strategically via a shortcut to the state information.
Remark 2. In control system design, sensors are designed
and implemented in advance, and system engineers design the
controllers knowing the relation between the sensor output
and the underlying state. Correspondingly, an attacker that
has infiltrated into the system can be aware of how the sensor
outputs have been constructed and can design his/her attack
accordingly. Therefore, there exists a hierarchy between S and
C such that C can have access to S’s strategies.
Infiltration Detection. We note that if the control inputs
could have been monitored perfectly, then any deviation of
the control input from the system-desired one could have
been detected instantly since both sensor outputs and control
inputs will be accessible. Therefore, in this paper, we address
the scenarios where the control input cannot be monitored
perfectly. As an example of such scenarios, the infiltration
detection mechanism can have access to noisy control input
observation yk ∈ Rr and the state xk as seen in Fig. 1. In the
scope of this work, we will not consider the details of how
the infiltration detector operates except that the advanced and
persistent attackers are aware of the presence of an infiltration
detector that can have access to the state (correspondingly the
sensor outputs) and noisy versions of the control inputs.
Inconspicuous Infiltration Attacks into C. As seen in Fig.
1, C is under infiltration attacks by the (advanced) attack-
ers A1, . . . ,At over the time horizon k = 1, . . . ,n and such
attacks may be successful or not in infiltrating into C. As
mentioned earlier, being advance refers to being target specific
with knowledge about underlying system dynamics while also
avoiding detection mechanisms by attacking inconspicuously.
Therefore, C can be a friend or an adversary within the
time horizon while S may not know C’s type surely until an
infiltration detection takes place, which may be less likely due
to inconspicuousness of the attacks. C observes s[1,k], knows
S’s strategies η[1,k] due to a hierarchy between the agents,
and, via a strategy γk ∈ Γk, can construct a closed-loop control
input uk, yet the state and the control input can be monitored
by the infiltration detector. Therefore, as an attack model, we
consider the situation where the attacker Ai, i= 1, . . . , t, selects
γAi,k ∈ Γk, k = κ, . . . ,n, where κ denotes the infiltration time,
to minimize the cost function:
JAi,κ(η[1,n]; ·,γAi,[κ,n]) = E
{ n
∑
k=κ
‖xAi,k+1− zi‖2QAi
+λi‖xAi,k+1‖2QF +‖uAi,k−uF,k‖2RAi
}
, (7)
where λi ≥ 0, “·” as an argument of the cost function (7)
refers to the C’s strategies γ1, . . . ,γκ−1, which are not selected
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Fig. 2: Possible transitions among the agents F, A1, and A2 to
be in charge of C within the time horizon.
by Ai; and zi ∈Rm is the desired state that the adversary seeks
to drive the system to. The matrices4 QAi ∈Rm×m are positive
semi-definite, and RAi ∈Rr×r are positive definite. Here, xAi,k
denotes the state driven by the adversarial control input uAi,k;
while uF,k denotes the control input that would have been
constructed if C was a friend.
Particularly, the last two terms in (7) are soft constraints
to avoid infiltration detection by being close to the expected
behavior of the system, e.g., small energy of the state xAi,k+1,
and small deviations of uAi,k from uF,k. Note that λi ≥ 0 can
also be zero. We also note that deviation of the state xAi,k+1
from the system-desired xF,k+1 is equivalent to
xAi,k+1−xF,k+1 = B(uAi,k−uF,k).
Furthermore, deviation of the observed control input5 yAi,k
from the system desired yF,k is equivalent to
yAi,k+1−yF,k+1 = D(uAi,k−uF,k).
Therefore, via RAi ∈ Rr×r, the attacker can take precau-
tions against the thresholding-based detection mechanisms that
check the deviation of the state or the control input from the
system-desired ones. We also note that uF would have been
constructed by C if there were no infiltration. Correspondingly,
the attacker can construct uAi,k by adding another signal on
top of uF,k such that uAi,k = uF,k + δu Ai,k as in [13], [14].
Therefore, the last term in (7) also corresponds to a soft energy
constraint on δu Ai,k.
In the following section, we provide a game theoretical
formulation to analyze the interaction between the agents.
III. HIERARCHICAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION
Cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to infiltration attacks.
Within the time horizon various attackers can infiltrate into the
system as well as defense mechanism can detect infiltration
and take appropriate actions accordingly. As an example,
Fig. 2 demonstrates possible transitions among the agents,
F, A1, and A2, to be in charge of C. When an attacker,
e.g., A1, infiltrates into the system, A1 becomes in charge
of C and can construct the control input according to his/her
adversarial objective. Furthermore, when the attackers are not
4For notational simplicity, we consider time-invariant λi, QAi ,RAi .
5By depending on uAi ,k , observed control inputs also depend on Ai’s ac-
tions. Therefore, we show this dependence explicitly by yAi,k := yk . Similarly,
the system-desired observation, i.e., F would have been in charge of C, is
denoted by yF,k .
5communicating with each other, an attacker, e.g., A2, may not
know whether the system is already under attack or not and
correspondingly may infiltrate into the system while A1 is still
in charge of C. Furthermore, there can be infiltration detection
due to the active defense mechanisms monitoring the control
and sensor inputs as seen in Fig. 1.
Remark 3. We point out that when infiltration has been
detected, the system could prefer to use different sensor outputs
since the uncertainty about C has been removed. As an
example, if the attacker cannot be forced to exfiltrate from
the system immediately, the system can prefer to use sensor
outputs designed specifically against the adversarial objectives
of the attacker. Or if F becomes in charge of C after detection,
as long as the system ensures F is in charge, direct state
disclosure can be preferred. Therefore, we consider scenarios
where the system switches his/her operation mode and uses
different sensor outputs, once an infiltration has been detected.
In order to model uncertainty of the transitions between
the agents to be in charge of C explicitly, we consider a
jump process {θ j ∈ Θ}, where Θ := {F,A1, . . . ,At ,T} and
transitions can occur on a different time scale called transition
time, e.g., κ ∈ {δ ,2δ , . . . ,Nδ}, where δ ∈ Z and N := dn/δe.
The state T denotes the switch to a different operation mode,
e.g., due to infiltration detection. Therefore, when the process
jumps to the state T, the horizon practically terminates for S.
Correspondingly, for a given sequence of the jump process:
θ1, . . . ,θN , if there is a jump to T, we let NT denote the index
of the last state before the jump, and otherwise NT =N+1, and
let h¯(θ[1,N]) be an ordered set including the non-terminating
transition times, and 1 and min{NTδ ,n+1}. As an illustrative
example, let n = 100 and δ = 30 and consider the situation
where F is in charge of C initially while A1 infiltrates into
C at k = 60 and becomes in charge until detection at k = 90.
Therefore, we have h¯(θ[1,N]) = {1,60,90}, which implies that
while θ1 = θ2 = F is in charge during the interval [1,60),
θ3 = A1 becomes in charge during the interval [60,90) and
the system switches its mode at k = 90.
The underlying state recursion is common knowledge to
both S and C (even if C can be an adversary). The type of C
and, if C is an adversary, his/her objective are not known by S.
However, S knows the statistics of the jump process {θ j}. As
also noted in Remark 1, there is also a hierarchy [21] between
the agents in the announcement of the strategies such that S
leads the game by announcing and sticking to his/her strategies
in advance, i.e., C knows η[1,n] in advance. Therefore, we can
model such a scheme as a multi-stage Bayesian Stackelberg
game, in which S is the leader.
Remark 4. When the infiltration detector has access to the
sensor outputs sk but not the states xk, even though the attacker
can also inject false data into the sensor outputs in order to
avoid detection as in integrity attacks, e.g., [8], [13], [14],
due to the “stochastic” state recursion (1), the attacker still
needs the actual sensor outputs, which are designed by the
system designer in advance. Therefore, secure sensor design
framework can also play a crucial role for the security of the
systems against integrity attacks.
The agents S and C aim to minimize their cost functions by
choosing the strategies η[1,n] and γ[1,n] while each strategy im-
plicitly depends on the other. Due to the hierarchy, C’s strate-
gies γθ ,k ∈ Γk, θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At}, depending on his/her type,
can also depend on S’s strategies η[1,k] and when the agent
becomes in charge of C. In order to show these dependences
explicitly, henceforth, we denote C’s strategies by γ(κ)θ ,k (η[1,k]),
which implies γ(κ)θ ,k (η[1,k])(s[1,k]) := γθ ,k(s[1,k]). Then, for given
S strategies η[1,n], we let Πθ ,κ(η[1,n])⊂⨉nk=κ Γk be the reaction
set of the agent θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At} who becomes in charge of
C at κ . And these reaction sets are given by:
Πθ ,κ(η[1,n]) := argmin
γ(κ)θ ,k∈Γk
k=κ,...,n
Jθ ,κ
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)θ ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
,
where γ(κ)θ ,[κ,n](η[1,n]) :=
{
γ(κ)θ ,κ(η[1,κ]), . . . ,γ
(κ)
θ ,n (η[1,n])
}
. Due to
the positive definiteness assumptions on Rθ , in the following
section, we will show that for each θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At}, the
corresponding reaction set Πθ ,κ is an equivalence class such
that all γ(κ)θ ,[κ,n] ∈ Πθ ,κ lead to the same random variable u∗θ ,k
almost everywhere on Rr. Therefore, the pair of strategies:[
η∗[1,n];
(
γ(κ)∗θ ,[κ,n],θ ∈Θ,κ ∈ h¯
)]
(8)
attains the Stackelberg equilibrium provided that
η∗[1,n] = argmin
ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,n
E
 ∑κ∈h¯(θ [1,N])Jκ+F,κ
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)∗θ j ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
(9a)
γ(κ)∗θ ,[κ,n](η[1,n]) = argmin
γ(κ)θ ,k∈Γk,
k=κ,...,n
Jθ ,κ
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)θ ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
, (9b)
where the expectation is taken over {θ j}, κ+ is the next
transition time after κ in h¯(θ[1,N]), θ j refers to the agent that
will be in charge of C in the interval [κ,κ+), and we define
Jκ+F,κ
(
η[1,n], ; ·,γ(κ)∗θ j ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
:= JF,κ
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)∗θ j ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
−JF,κ+
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)∗θ j ,[κ+,n](η[1,n])
)
as the cost in impact since the agent θ j is in charge of C during
[κ,κ+) even though he/she has selected his/her strategies as
if he/she will be in charge until the end of the horizon.
Remark 5. Even though S has access to the statistics of the
jump process, computation of the expectation (9a) over all
possible sequences {θ 1, . . . ,θ N} is computationally expensive
since there are O(tN) sequences, where t is the number of
attackers. Note that most of these sequences have relatively
low probability. As an example, multiple successful attacks by
different attackers consecutively can be considered as a rare
event. Therefore, we let Ω⊂ΘN be the set of selected, typical,
sequences. For example, Ω can include the sequences such that
there will be at most one infiltration (by any of the attackers)
and the infiltration may or may not be detected until the end
of the time horizon. Then, S will consider O(tN2) sequences.
Note that each sequence corresponds to a different infiltration
scenario. Also let µ(θ [1,N]) denote the normalized measure of
a sequence θ [1,N] ∈Ω, i.e., ∑θ [1,N]∈Ω µ(θ [1,N]) = 1.
6Based on Remark 5, the pair (8) leads to the Stackelberg
equilibrium provided that
η∗[1,n] = argmin
ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,n
∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N])∑
κ∈h¯(θ [1,N])
Jκ+F,κ
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)∗θ j ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
(10a)
γ(κ)∗θ ,[κ,n](η[1,n]) = argmin
γ(κ)θ ,k∈Γk,
k=κ,...,n
Jθ ,κ
(
η[1,n]; ·,γ(κ)θ ,[κ,n](η[1,n])
)
, (10b)
Remark 6. We note that any brute force approach, trying
to solve the optimization problem (10a) numerically (since it
is a finite dimensional problem due to linear memoryless S
strategies), e.g., via particle swarm optimization [22], needs
to find n matrices with m×m dimensions, corresponding to
nm2 parameters, where m is the dimension of the state and n
is the number of stages (i.e., time horizon). In particular, we
would be searching for a point in R(nm2) dimensional space, in
addition to the computational load to compute the cost (10a)
associated with those points. Furthermore, the result of such
a numerical approach would only imply a local optimum, and
not the global one.
In the following sections, we analyze the equilibrium
achieving strategies.
IV. OPTIMAL FOLLOWER (CONTROLLER) REACTIONS
For any given S strategies, η[1,n], we aim to compute the
corresponding reactions γ(κ)θ ,k (η[1,k]) for θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At},
k= κ, . . . ,n, and κ ∈ {δ , . . . ,Nδ}. To this end, we first provide
friendly C reactions for given sensor strategies and then, we
compute adversarial C reactions correspondingly.
A. Optimal Agent-F Reaction
Based on Remark 3, secure sensor designer is only inter-
ested in the reaction of F when he/she is in charge of C
starting from time k= 1. We note that given linear memoryless
S strategies, the problem is an LQG control problem for F
[17]. In the following, for completeness, we will derive the
corresponding optimal control inputs.
In order to facilitate the subsequent analysis, we can rewrite
the state equations (1)-(4) and the cost function (6) without al-
tering the optimization problem. Particularly, after completing
the squares [17], [23], the friendly objective (6) is equivalent
to:
min
γF,k∈Γk
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
E‖uF,k +KF,kxF,k‖2∆F,k +GF, (11)
where6
∆F,k = B′QˇF,k+1B+RF, (12a)
KF,k = ∆−1F,kB
′QˇF,k+1A, (12b)
GF = tr{Σ1(QˇF,1−QF)}+
n
∑
k=1
tr{ΣvQˇF,k+1}. (12c)
6Note that ∆F,k is invertible since RF  O and QF  O.
The sequence {QˇF,k} is defined through the following discrete-
time Riccati equation:
QˇF,k = QF+A′
(
QˇF,k+1− QˇF,k+1B∆−1F,kB′QˇF,k+1
)
A, (13a)
QˇF,n+1 = QF. (13b)
Then, through a change of variables [23], friendly type C’s
objective (11) can be written as
min
γF,k∈Γk
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
E‖uoF,k +KF,kxoF,k‖2∆F,k +GF (14)
subject to (12)-(13) and for k = 1, · · · ,n,
xok+1 = Ax
o
k +vk and x
o
1 = x1, (15a)
uoF,k = uF,k +KF,kBuF,k−1+ · · ·+KF,kAk−2BuF,1, (15b)
Note that, now, the process {xok} is independent of how the
control inputs uF,k (and uoF,k) are constructed while the sensor
outputs by depending on the current state xF,k also depend on
the previous control inputs.
Applying the Principle of Optimality to (14), in view of
(5), leads to the result that the last stage optimal transformed
control input is given by
uo∗F,n =−KF,nE{xon|s[1,n]}
=−KF,nE{xon|L ′1xF,1, . . . ,L ′nxF,n}. (16)
However, by (15a), we have
L ′kxF,k =L
′
kx
o
k +L
′
k BuF,k−1+ . . .+L
′
k A
k−2BuF,1︸ ︷︷ ︸, (17)
where the underbraced term is σ -s[1,k−1] measurable, for k =
1, . . . ,n. Therefore, (16) is equivalent to
uo∗F,n =−KF,nE{xon|L ′1xo1, . . . ,L ′nxon} (18)
and does not depend on previous control inputs. Therefore, by
induction, we can conclude that the problem entails classical
information and for k = 1, . . . ,n, the optimal transformed
control input is given by
uo∗F,k =−KF,kE{xok |s[1,k]} (19)
almost everywhere on Rr, for k = 1, . . . ,n, which would also
imply the uniqueness of the best F reactions and singleton
reaction set ΠF,1. Then, by (15b) and (19), the optimal control
inputs are given by
u∗F,n...
u∗F,1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: u∗F
=−

Ir KF,nB KF,nAB ... KF,nAn−2B
Ir KF,n−1B ··· KF,n−1An−3B
Ir ··· KF,n−2An−4B
. . .
Ir

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ΦF
−1[KF,n
. . .
KF,1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: KF
=: xˆo︷ ︸︸ ︷[
xˆon...
xˆo1
]
,
(20)
where xˆok := E{xok |s[1,k]}, and equivalently:
u∗F =−Φ−1F KF xˆo. (21)
7B. Optimal Adversarial Reaction (Attack)
Here, we compute the optimal attack strategies with control
objective (7). Different from Subsection IV-A, now, we also
consider the scenarios where Ai can infiltrate into C at k > 1.
That would imply that an attacker A j can infiltrate into
C that has already been infiltrated into by another attacker
Ai. Furthermore, the attacker may not know the underlying
statistics of the jump process corresponding to the transitions
among the agents that can be in charge of C. Correspondingly,
the attacker may not know how the state has been driven until
he/she has infiltrated into. However, as also noted in Remark
4, consecutive succesful infiltration by different attackers can
be considered as a rare event relative to the infiltration of the
attacker into C while F was in charge. Therefore, as an attack
model, we consider the scenarios where the attackers can
assume that F was in charge of C before they have infiltrated
into.
Next, we aim to rewrite the state equations and the cost
functions as in (11) and (14) for the minimization of the
adversarial objectives (7). For k = κ, . . . ,n, let
δu Ai,k := uAi,k−uF,k. (22)
Then, instead of (1), consider the following recursion: xAi,k+1uF
zi
= [ A Om×(n−k)r B Om×(k−1)r Om
O Im+nr
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: A¯k
×
 xAi,kuF
zi

︸ ︷︷ ︸
= x¯Ai ,k
+
[
B
O(m+nr)×r
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: B¯
δu Ai,k +
[
Im
O
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: E
vk,
which can be written in compact form as
x¯Ai,k+1 = A¯k x¯Ai,k + B¯δu Ai,k +Evk. (23)
Correspondingly, the objective (7) can be rewritten as
n
∑
k=κ
E
{
‖ x¯Ai,k+1‖2Q¯Ai +‖δu Ai,k‖
2
RAi
}
, (24)
where
Q¯Ai :=
[
QAi+λiQF O −QAi
O O O
−QAi O QAi
]
 O. (25)
We point out the resemblance between (24) and (6).
As in (11), we can rewrite the cost function (24) without al-
tering the optimization problem. After completing the squares,
the adversarial objective (24) is equivalent to:
min
γ(κ)Ai ,k∈Γk
k=κ,...,n
n
∑
k=κ
E‖δu Ai,k +KAi,k x¯Ai,k‖2∆Ai ,k +GAi,κ , (26)
where
∆Ai,k = B¯
′QˇAi,k+1B¯+RAi , (27a)
KAi,k = ∆
−1
Ai,k
B¯′QˇAi,k+1A¯k, (27b)
GAi,κ = tr{Σ¯Ai,κ(QˇAi,κ − Q¯Ai)}+
n
∑
k=κ
tr{Σ¯vQˇAi,k+1}, (27c)
and Σ¯Ai,κ :=E{ x¯Ai,κ x¯′Ai,κ}, Σ¯v := EΣvE ′. Note that x¯Ai,κ (cor-
respondingly Σ¯Ai,κ ) does not depend on Ai’s strategies γ
(κ)
Ai,[κ,n]
,
and instead depends on γF,[1,κ−1]. The sequence {QˇAi,k} is
defined through the following discrete-time Riccati equation:
QˇAi,k = Q¯Ai + A¯
′
k
(
QˇAi,k+1− QˇAi,k+1B¯∆−1Ai,kB¯′QˇAi,k+1
)
A¯k,
QˇAi,n+1 = Q¯Ai . (28)
We emphasize that KAi,k, ∆Ai,k, and QˇAi,k do not depend on
the infiltration time κ .
And corresponding to (14), the adversarial objective (26)
can be written as
min
γAi ,k∈Γk
k=κ,...,n
n
∑
k=κ
E‖δu oAi,k +KAi,k x¯oAi,k‖2∆Ai ,k +GAi,κ (29)
subject to (27)-(28) and for k = 1, . . . ,n,
x¯oAi,k+1 = A¯k x¯
o
Ai,k +Evk and x¯
o
Ai,1 = x¯Ai,1, (30a)
δu oAi,k = δu Ai,k +KAi,kB¯δu Ai,k−1+KAi,kA¯k−1B¯δu Ai,k−2+ . . .
+KAi,kA¯k−1 · · · A¯κ+1B¯δu Ai,κ +KAi,kA¯k−1 · · · A¯κ B¯δu κ−1+ . . .
+KAi,kA¯k−1 · · · A¯2B¯δu 1. (30b)
Note that in (29), GAi,κ does not depend on the adversary’s
optimization arguments even though it depends on uF due to
Σ¯Ai,κ in (27c). However, F does not consider the impact of uF
on GAi,κ while selecting γF,[1,n] since (29) is the cost function
of Ai, and not of F. Note also that if F is in charge of C before
Ai has infiltrated into C, for k = 1, . . . ,κ−1, we have
δu k = 0. (31)
Even though the process { x¯oAi,k} is independent of how the
control inputs δu Ai,k (and δu
o
Ai,k
) are constructed, the sensor
outputs sk, k= κ, . . . ,n, depend on the taken actions, i.e., uAi,k.
Similar to (16), the Principle of Optimality yields
δu o∗Ai,n =−KAi,nE{ x¯oAi,k|L ′1xAi,1, . . . ,L ′nxAi,n}. (32)
Then, irrespective of (30a) and (23), we have
L ′kxAi,k =L
′
kx
o
n+L
′
k BuAi,k−1+ . . .+L
′
k A
k−κ−1BuAi,κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ . . .+L ′k A
k−2BuF,1︸ ︷︷ ︸, (33)
where xok evolves according to (15a) and the underbraced terms
are σ -s[1,k−1] measurable. Therefore, (32) is equivalent to
δu o∗Ai,n =−KAi,nE{ x¯oAi,k|L ′1xo1, . . . ,L ′nxon} (34)
and does not depend on the previous control inputs uAi,[κ,n−1].
Remark 7. We emphasize that if Ai does not know which
agent was in charge of C before κ , then the relation between
u[1,κ−1] and the corresponding sensor outputs s[1,κ−1] would
not be known by Ai and correspondingly (34) would not be
equivalent of (32). Furthermore, the equivalence does also
not hold if another attacker had already infiltrated when Ai
infiltrates since Ai has assumed that F was in charge before the
infiltration. Note also that S is only interested in the scenarios
where θ [1,N] ∈ Ω, i.e., there is no successful consecutive
infiltration by different attackers. A detailed analysis of the
8consecutive successful infiltration and attacks with partial
information is left as future work.
By induction, we can conclude that the optimal transformed
control inputs of Ai are given by
δu o∗Ai,k =−KAi,kE{ x¯oAi,k|s[1,k]}, (35)
for k = κ, . . . ,n, almost everywhere on Rr. This implies the
uniqueness of the best Ai reactions and singleton reaction set
ΠAi,κ . Then, by (30b), we have
δu oAi ,n
δu oAi ,n−1...
δu oAi ,κ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: δu (κ)oAi
=
 Ir KAi ,nB¯ ··· KAi ,nA¯n−1...A¯κ+1B¯Ir ··· KAi ,n−1A¯n−2...A¯κ+1B¯. . . ...
Ir

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: Φ(κ)Ai ∈R
(n−κ+1)r×(n−κ+1)r

δu Ai ,n
δu Ai ,n−1...
δu Ai ,κ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: δu (κ)Ai
(36)
which can also be written as
δu (κ)oAi =Φ
(κ)
Ai δu
(κ)
Ai (37)
while (35) leads to
δu (κ)o∗Ai =−
[KAi ,n . . .
KAi ,κ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: K(κ)Ai
 E{x¯oAi ,n|s[1,n]}...
E{x¯oAi ,κ |s[1,κ]}
 . (38)
Next, we seek to compute E{ x¯oAi,k|s[1,k]} in (38) in terms of
xˆo. To this end, let us take a closer look at (30a): xˇk+1uF
zi
= [ A · · · B · · · Om
O Im+nr
] xˇkuF
zi
+[ Im
O
]
vk,
where we introduce xˇk, which is given by
xˇk = xok +BuF,k−1+ABuF,k−2+ · · ·+Ak−2BuF,1. (39)
Then, we have xˇnxˇn−1...
xˇ1
=
 x
o
n
xon−1...
xo1
+
O B AB ··· An−2BO O B ··· An−3B... ...
O O ··· ··· O

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: Ψ
 uF,nuF,n−1...
uF,1
 .
Let Ψ be partitioned as Ψ = [Ψ′n · · ·Ψ′1]′ such that xˇk = xok +
ΨkuF. Therefore, E{ x¯oAi,k|s[1,k]} can be written as
E{ x¯oAi,k|s[1,k]}=
[E{xok |s[1,k]}+ΨkE{uF|s[1,k]}
E{uF|s[1,k]}
zi
]
. (40)
Furthermore, (21) leads to
E{uF|s[1,k]}=−Φ−1F KF
[E{E{xon|s[1,n]}|s[1,k]}...
E{E{xo1|s1}|s[1,k]}
]
. (41)
Note that we have
E{E{xol |s[1,l]}|s[1,k]}=
{
E{xol |s[1,k]} if l ≥ k
E{xol |s[1,l]} if l < k
,
where the first case, i.e., l ≥ k, follows due to the iterated ex-
pectations with nested conditioning sets, i.e., {s[1,l]} ⊇ {s[1,k]}
if l ≥ k; and the second case, i.e., l < k, follows since
E{xol |s[1,l]} is σ -s[1,k] measurable if l < k. Therefore, (41) can
be written as
E{uF|s[1,k]}=−Φ−1F KF

O
An−k
...
A
Im
O
O O I(k−1)m

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: Lk
xˆo, (42)
where the middle block is the kth block column from the right.
Hence, we can rewrite (40) as
E{ x¯oAi,k|s[1,k]}=
[
Ek−ΨkΦ−1F KFLk
−Φ−1F KFLk
Om
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: Fk
xˆo+
[
Om×1
Onr×1
zi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: zi
, (43)
where Ek := [Om×(n−k)m Im Om×(k−1)m ] is the indicator matrix such
that E{xok |s[1,k]}= Ek xˆo, k = 1, . . . ,n. Then, by (35), (38), and
(43), we have
δu (κ)o∗Ai =−K
(κ)
Ai

[
Fn...
Fκ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: F(κ)
xˆo+1n−κ+1⊗ zi
 . (44)
Therefore, (44) and (37) lead to
δu (κ)∗Ai =−(Φ
(κ)
Ai )
−1K(κ)Ai
(
F(κ) xˆo+1n−κ+1⊗ zi
)
.
Note that by (31) and (21), we obtain
u(κ)∗Ai = −
(
(Φ(κ)Ai )
−1K(κ)Ai F
(κ)+[ I(n−κ+1)r O(n−κ+1)r×(κ−1)r ]Φ−1F KF
)
xˆo
− (Φ(κ)Ai )−1K
(κ)
Ai
(
1n−κ+1⊗ zi
)
. (45)
In the following theorem, we recap these results.
Theorem 1. Given S’s strategies η[1,n], C’s optimal reactions
γ(κ)θ ,k (η[1,k]), where θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At}, are given by (21) or
(45) depending on whether C is a friend or an adversary,
respectively. These reaction strategies are unique.
In the following section, we formulate S’s optimal strategies.
V. OPTIMAL LEADER (SENSOR) ACTIONS
For any given η[1,n], Theorem 1 provides the unique optimal
reactions of friendly and adversarial agents. Now, for each se-
quence θ[1,N] ∈Ω, we aim to compute the optimal S strategies
that minimize
∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N]) ∑
κ∈h¯(θ [1,N])
κ+−1
∑
k=κ
E
{
‖xk+1‖2QF +‖u
(κ)∗
θ j ,k‖
2
RF
}
. (46)
To this end, we first seek to write u(κ)∗θ ,k , θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At},
derived in (21) and (45), in the same form. By (21), we have
u∗F =−Φ−1F KF︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: T (1)F
xˆo. (47)
9Correspondingly, (45) leads to
u(κ)∗Ai =−
=: Z(κ)Ai︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Φ(κ)Ai )
−1K(κ)Ai
(
1n−κ+1⊗ zi
)
−
(
(Φ(κ)Ai )
−1K(κ)Ai F
(κ)+[ I(n−κ+1)r O(n−κ+1)r×(κ−1)r ]Φ−1F KF
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: T (κ)Ai
xˆo.
Let Z(1)F = 0 be a zero vector, then for θ ∈ {F,A1, . . . ,At}, we
obtain
u(κ)θ =−T (κ)θ xˆo−Z(κ)θ , (48)
where T (κ)θ is a (n−κ+1)r×nm matrix and Z(κ)θ ∈R(n−κ+1)r.
However, in (46), only u(κ)∗θ j ,k for k= κ, . . . ,κ+−1 are included.
Let κT be the last non-terminating state transition time, and nT
denote the termination time corresponding to a jump to state
T or end of horizon. Then, by (48), for a given realization of
the process {θ j}, e.g., θ[1,N] ∈Ω, we have
=:u∗θ[1,N]∈R
nT r︷ ︸︸ ︷MκT u
(κT )∗
θ jT...
M1u
(1)∗
θ1
=−
=:Tθ[1,N]∈R
nT r×nm︷ ︸︸ ︷MκT T
(κT )
θ jT...
M1T
(1)
θ1
 xˆo−
=:Zθ[1,N]∈R
nT r︷ ︸︸ ︷MκT Z
(κT )
θ jT...
M1Z
(1)
θ1
 ,
where Mκ ∈ R(κ+−κ)r×(n−κ+1)r is given by Mκ = [O I(κ+−κ)r ].
Therefore, we obtain
u∗θ[1,N] =−Tθ[1,N] xˆo−Zθ[1,N] . (49)
Even though S constructs a single set of strategies {ηk ∈
ϒ} without knowing C’s type, the resulting sensor outputs
{sk = ηk(xk)} depend on the state xk, hence C’s type and
correspondingly θ[1,N]. However, as shown in Section IV, the
problem entails classical information and xˆo does not depend
on θ[1,N]. Therefore, let u∗θ[1,N],k be the corresponding control
input at time k according to (49) for a given realization θ[1,N].
Then, the objective function (46) can be written as
min
ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,nT
∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N])
nT
∑
k=1
E
{
‖xθ [1,N],k+1‖2QF +‖u∗θ [1,N],k‖
2
RF
}
.
(50)
Note that the inner summation can be written as
nT
∑
k=1
E‖u∗θ [1,N],k +K
[nT ]
S,k xθ [1,N],k‖2∆[nT ]S,k
+G[nT ]S , (51)
where
∆[nT ]S,k = B
′Qˇ[nT ]S,k+1B+RF (52a)
K[nT ]S,k = (∆
[nT ]
S,k )
−1B′Qˇ[nT ]S,k+1A (52b)
G[nT ]S = tr{Σ1(Qˇ[nT ]S,1 −QF)}+
nT
∑
k=1
tr{ΣvQˇ[nT ]S,k+1}. (52c)
Similar to (13), the sequence {Qˇ[nT ]S,k } is defined through the
following discrete-time Riccati equation:
Qˇ[nT ]S,k = QF+A
′(Qˇ[nT ]S,k+1− Qˇ[nT ]S,k+1B(∆[nT ]S,k )−1B′Qˇ[nT ]S,k+1)A,
QˇS,nT+1 = QF. (53)
Then, by (14), (51) leads to
nT
∑
k=1
E‖uo∗θ [1,N],k +K
[nT ]
S,k x
o
k‖2∆[nT ]S,k
+G[nT ]S . (54)
subject to (52a), where xok evolves according to (15a), and
uo∗θ [1,N],k = u
∗
θ [1,N],k+K
[nT ]
S,k Bu
∗
θ [1,N],k−1+ . . .+K
[nT ]
S,k A
k−2Bu∗θ [1,N],1.
We point out that due to time-invariant QF and RF, we have
Qˇ[nT ]S,k = QˇF,k+n−nT ,
K[nT ]S,k = KF,k+n−nT ,
∆[nT ]S,k = ∆F,k+n−nT , (55)
where QˇF,k, KF,k, and ∆F,k are defined in (14). Therefore, the
summation can be written as
nT
∑
k=1
‖uo∗θ [1,N],k+K
[nT ]
S,k x
o
k‖2∆[nT ]S,k
= E‖uo∗θ [1,N] +K
[nT ]
S x
o‖2
∆[nT ]S
, (56)
where
∆[nT ]S := [ InT r OnT r×(n−nT )r ]
[∆F,n
. . .
∆F,1
][ InT r
O(n−nT )r×nT r
]
,
K[nT ]S := [ InT r OnT r×(n−nT )r ]KF
[ InT m
O(n−nT )m×nT m
]
[OnT m×(n−nT )m InT m ] .
Furthermore, in terms of u∗θ [1,N] , u
o∗
θ [1,N]
is given by
uo∗θ [1,N] =

Ir K
[nT ]
S,nT
B ... K[nT ]S,nT
AnT−2B
Ir ··· K[nT ]S,nT−1A
nT−3B
. . .
Ir
u∗θ [1,N]
= [ InT r OnT r×(n−nT )r ]ΦF
[ InT r
O(n−nT )r×nT r
]
u∗θ [1,N] . (57)
Next, we introduce the parameters:
Ξ[nT ]θ [1,N] :=− [ I O ]ΦF
[
I
O
]
Tθ [1,N] (58)
ξ [nT ]θ [1,N] :=− [ I O ]ΦF
[
I
O
]
Zθ [1,N] , (59)
almost everywhere on RrnT×mn and RrnT , respectively, so that
uo∗θ [1,N] = Ξ
[nT ]
θ [1,N]
xˆo+ξ [nT ]θ [1,N] . (60)
Therefore, the objective (50) can be written as
min
ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,n
∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N])
(
E‖Ξθ xˆo+ξθ +Kxo‖2∆+G
)
, (61)
where for notational simplicity, we let Ξθ := Ξ
[nT ]
θ [1,N]
, ξθ :=
ξ [nT ]θ [1,N] , K := K
[nT ]
S , ∆ := ∆
[nT ]
S , and G :=G
[nT ]
S . The expectation
term in (61) yields
E‖Ξθ xˆo+ξθ +Kxo‖2∆ = E{(xˆo)′Ξ′θ∆Ξθ xˆo}
+2E{(xˆo)′Ξ′θ∆Kxo}+E{(xo)′K′∆K(xo)}
+2E{ξ ′θ∆(Ξθ xˆo+Kxo)}+E{ξ ′θ∆ξθ }. (62)
Note that xˆo and xo have zero mean and are independent
of θ [1,N] by (18) and (34). Correspondingly, E{ξ ′θ∆(Ξθ xˆo +
Kxo)}= 0. Furthermore, the terms
E{(xo)′K′∆K(xo)}= tr{E{xo(xo)′}K′∆K}
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and
E{ξ ′θ∆ξθ }= tr{ξθ ξ ′θ∆}
do not depend on the optimization arguments η[1,n]. Therefore,
(62) yields
E‖Ξθ xˆo+ξθ +Kxo‖2∆ = tr
{
E{ xˆo(xˆo)′}Ξ′θ∆Ξθ
}
+ tr{E{xo(xˆo)′}Ξ′θ∆K}+ tr{E{ xˆo(xo)′}K′∆Ξθ }
+ tr
{
E{xo(xo)′}K′∆K}+ tr{ξθ ξ ′θ∆
}
. (63)
We aim to compute E{ xˆo(xˆo)′}, E{xo(xˆo)′}, and
E{xo(xo)′}. Let Σok := E{xok(xok)′}. Then, we have
Σo := E{xo(xo)′}=

Σon AΣon−1 ··· An−1Σo1
Σon−1A
′ Σon−1 ··· An−2Σo1...
...
. . .
...
Σo1(A
n−1)′ Σo1(A
n−2)′ ··· Σo1
 . (64)
Furthermore, let Hk := E{ xˆok(xˆok)′}. Then, E{ xˆo(xˆo)′} can be
written as
E{ xˆo(xˆo)′}=
[E{ xˆon(xˆon)′} ··· E{xˆon(xˆo1)′}... . . . ...
E{ xˆo1(xˆon)′} ··· E{xˆo1(xˆo1)′}
]
=
 Hn AHn−1 ··· A
n−1H1
Hn−1A′ Hn−1 ··· An−2H1...
...
. . .
...
H1(An−1)′ H1(An−2)′ ··· H1
 (65)
since for l < k, we have
E{ xˆol (xˆok)′}= E{E{ xˆol (xˆok)′|s[1,l]}}
(a)
= E{ xˆol E{ xˆok |s[1,l]}}
(b)
= E{ xˆol (xˆol )′}(Ak−l)′,
where (a) holds since xˆol is σ -s[1,l] measurable, and (b) follows
due to the iterated expectations with nested conditioning sets,
i.e., {s[1,l]}⊆ {s[1,k]}. We also note that for l≤ k, E{ xˆol (xok)′}=
E{ xˆol (xol )′}(Ak−l)′ since v j, j > l, and xˆol , which is σ -s[1,l]
measurable, are independent of each other and {vk} is a zero-
mean white noise process. This leads to
E{ xˆol (xol )′}= E{E{ xˆol (xol )′|s[1,l]}}
= E{ xˆol (xˆol )′}
due to the law of iterated expectations. This implies that
E{ xˆol (xok)′}= E{ xˆol (xˆol )′}(Ak−l)′
= E{ xˆol (xˆok)′}
and correspondingly E{ xˆo(xo)′}= E{ xˆo(xˆo)′}.
Next, we can rewrite (61) as
min
ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,n
tr

 Hn AHn−1 ··· A
n−1H1
Hn−1A′ Hn−1 ··· An−2H1...
...
. . .
...
H1(An−1)′ H1(An−2)′ ··· H1
Π
+Πo, (66)
where
Π := ∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N]){Ξ′θ∆Ξθ +Ξ′θ∆K+K′∆Ξθ }, (67a)
Πo := ∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N])(tr{ΣoK′∆K}+ tr{ξθ ξ ′θ∆}+G), (67b)
TABLE I: Computation of secure sensor strategies.
Algorithm 1: Secure Sensor Design
Compute Vk’s:
Compute KF,k,∆F,k , and KAi ,k for k = 1, . . . ,n and i = 1, . . . , t
via (12) and (27).
Compute ΦF by (20), Φ
(1)
Ai
by (36), and F(1) by (44).
Compute Π and Πo, given by (67), by computing Ξθ and ξθ
for all θ [1,N] ∈Ω.
Then, compute Vk , k = 1, . . . ,n, via (69).
SDP Problem:
Solve the SDP problem on the left hand side of (70) through
a numerical toolbox, e.g., CVX [25], [26], and obtain the
solutions S∗k , for k = 1, . . . ,n.
Set S∗0 = O.
Equilibrium achieving sensor strategies:
Compute the corresponding idempotent matrices Pk ,∀k, by
using S∗k , ∀k, and (71).
Compute the eigen decompositions: Pk =UkΛkU ′k .
Compute Lk , ∀k, by using S∗k−1,Uk,Λk , and (75).
And ηk(xk) =L ′kxk .
which are independent of the optimization arguments. Hence,
the optimization problem (66) faced by S can be written as an
affine function of Hk’s as follows:
min
ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
tr{VkHk}+Πo, (68)
for certain symmetric deterministic matrices7 Vk ∈ Sm, k =
1, . . . ,n, which are given by
Vk :=Πk,k +
n
∑
l=k+1
Πk,lAl−k +(Al−k)′Πl,k, (69)
and Πk,l is the corresponding m×m sub-block of Π.
As a secure sensor designer, we seek to solve this non-
linear optimization problem (68). Note that Hk = E{ xˆok(xˆok)′}
and xˆok = E{xok |s[1,k]}. However, as pointed out in Remark
6, a brute force approach is computationally expensive. To
this end, we employ the approach in [24], which considers
another optimization problem that bounds the original one
from below, and then, compute strategies for the original
problem, which optimize the lower bound. Based on this, the
following theorem characterizes equilibrium achieving secure
sensor strategies.
Theorem 2. The optimal linear secure sensor strategies can
be computed via Algorithm 1, described in Table I.
Proof. Based on Lemma 3 in [24], by characterizing neces-
sary conditions on Hk’s, we have
min Sk∈Sm,
k=1,...,n
∑nk=1 tr{VkSk} ≤ min ηk∈ϒ,
k=1,...,n
∑nk=1 tr{VkHk},
s.t. Σoj  S j  AS j−1A′ ∀ j
(70)
7Sm denotes the set of m×m symmetric matrices.
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where Σoj = E{xoj(xoj)′}, S0 := O. Note that the left hand side
of (70) is an SDP problem. By invoking Theorem 4 in [24],
we can characterize the solution, S∗1, . . . ,S
∗
n, as
S∗k = AS
∗
k−1A
′+(Σok−AS∗k−1A′)1/2Pk(Σok−AS∗k−1A′)1/2, (71)
for k = 1, . . . ,n, where S∗0 = O and Pk ∈ Sm is a certain
symmetric idempotent matrix. Note that by solving the SDP
problem numerically, we can compute the corresponding Pk’s.
Next, say that S employs memoryless linear policies sk =
ηk(xk) =L ′kxk. Then, by (17) and (33), we have
xˆok = E{xok |L ′1xo1, . . . ,L ′kxok}.
which can also be written as
xˆok = Axˆ
o
k−1+(Σ
o
k−AHk−1A′)Lk(L ′k(Σok−AHk−1A′)Lk)†
×L ′k(xok−Axˆok−1), (72)
for k = 1, . . . ,n, xˆo−1 := 0 and H0 := O. Therefore, Hk =
E{ xˆok(xˆok)′} is given by
Hk = AHk−1A′+(Σok−AHk−1A′)Lk(L ′k(Σok−AHk−1A′)Lk)†
×L ′k(Σok−AHk−1A′). (73)
We emphasize the resemblance between (71) and (73). In
particular, if we set L¯k := (Σok−AHk−1A′)1/2Lk, k = 1, . . . ,n,
(73) yields
Hk = AHk−1A′+(Σok−AHk−1A′)1/2L¯k(L¯ ′kL¯k)†L¯ ′k
× (Σok−AHk−1A′)1/2, (74)
where L¯k(L¯ ′kL¯k)
†L¯ ′k is also a symmetric idempotent matrix
just like Pk in (71).
Therefore, given Pk’s, let Pk =UkΛkU ′k be the eigen decom-
position, and set L¯k =UkΛk, i.e., set
Lk = (Σok−AS∗k−1A′)−1/2UkΛk. (75)
Then, we obtain Hk = S∗k , which implies that S’s optimal
strategies are given by (75) while the optimal control inputs
for both friendly and adversarial C are given by (21) or (45),
respectively. 
Remark 8. We have considered that S knows the underlying
state transition probabilities, i.e., the statistics of the jump
process {θ j}. However, for a robust design against inaccurate
perception of the statistics, S can design the sensor outputs by
being cautious for the worst case scenario. For all possible
measures of θ [1,N] ∈Ω, we can recompute Π and Πo in (67).
Let V denote the set of the corresponding (V1, . . . ,Vn) tuples,
which can be computed via (69). Then, by (70), the worst case
scenario is equivalent to
max
V[1,n]∈V
min
Sk∈Sm,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
tr{VkSk} (76)
subject to Σ j  S j  AS j−1A′, j = 1, . . . ,n and S0 =O. If V is
compact and convex, there exists a saddle point equilibrium
by the Minimax theorem [21]. Otherwise, we can consider the
convex hull of V , denoted by V c for computational simplicity
in addition to robustness. A detailed analysis in that direction
is left as future work.
In the following section, we provide several numerical
examples examining the performance of secure sensor design.
TABLE II: Comparison of JˆS, defined in (78), of different
schemes for the cases shown in Fig. 3.
Cases Probability Classical Secure
No Sensor
Output
1 0.700 0 0.1 476
2 0.025 10.5 1.9 295.3
3 0.025 30.7 13.2 609.0
4 0.025 57.2 32.0 886.9
5 0.025 11.3 2.5 604.6
6 0.025 37.8 21.3 882.4
7 0.025 17.6 10.0 877.8
8 0.025 32.2 20.7 884.7
9 0.025 68.9 43.8 896.9
10 0.025 27.8 14.3 612.2
11 0.025 104.3 66.2 908.7
12 0.025 63.2 36.7 624.0
13 0.025 26.5 13.6 302.6
Average 12.2 7.0 821.2
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
As numerical illustrations, we consider two different scenar-
ios: Scenario 1, where we compare the performance of the pro-
posed secure sensors with classical sensors that disclose xk to
C directly, and Scenario 2, where we analyze the robustness of
the proposed scheme against inaccurate perception of the state
transition statistics, i.e., µP(θ[1,N]) 6= µ(θ[1,N]) for θ[1,N] ∈ Ω,
where µP denotes the perceived statistics while µ denotes the
actual ones. We set time horizon n= 100, the state’s dimension
m= 8, and the control input’s dimension r= 2. The matrices in
the state recursion (1) are set randomly according to uniform
distribution such that A is not a singular matrix and scaled
by 0.1 in order to avoid computational instability. In order
to construct auto-covariance matrices Σ1 and Σv, we draw
a number from the uniform distribution on the unit interval
[0,1] for each entry of a matrix D. Then, we can construct
a positive-definite covariance matrix by (D+D′)/2+ 2mI,
where the last term ensures that the constructed matrix is
diagonally dominant, and therefore, positive-definite. Then,
we have scaled Σv by 10 since the sensor outputs play more
essential role for C when the state noise variance is larger.
Scenario 1 - Performance Comparison. We specifically
consider the scenario where there are two adversaries, who
seek to regularize state xk around z1,z2 ∈ Rm that are drawn
from a multivariate Gaussian distribution. The positive semi-
definite weight matrices in the cost functions are set such that
QF =
[
Im/2 O
O O
]
,QA1 =
[
O O
O Im/4
]
,QA2 =
[
O O
O Im/2
]
, (77)
and RF = RA1 = RA2 = Ir while λ1 = λ2 = 0.1. The state
transition interval is set δ = 35 and Fig. 3 shows the possible
state transitions, e.g., θ [1,N] ∈Ω, within the time horizon. We
consider the situation where the normalized measure of no-
infiltration case, i.e., θ[1,N] = {F,F,F}, referred to as Case-1,
is 0.7 while all the other cases, i.e., Cases 2-13, have the same
measure, as tabulated in Table II.
In Table II, we compare the performances of three different
schemes for the cases shown in Fig. 3. The classical scheme
refers to a sensor, who discloses xk directly to C, while no
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Fig. 3: Possible state transitions within the time horizon.
sensor output refers to open-loop control of the system, i.e.,
sk = 0 almost everywhere on Rm. As a performance measure
for each θ [1,N] ∈Ω, we consider (51), where the last term G[nT ]S ,
which does not depend on S’s strategies η[1,n], is excluded, i.e.,
JˆS(θ [1,N]) :=
nT
∑
k=1
E‖uθ [1,N] +K
[nT ]
S,k xθ [1,N],k‖2∆[nT ]S,k
(78)
and, on the average,
∑
θ [1,N]∈Ω
µ(θ [1,N])JˆS(θ [1,N]). (79)
In Table II, we have observed that open-loop control of the
system leads to inferior performance compared to the other
schemes in all the cases. The classical scheme outperforms
the proposed secure sensor scheme only in Case 1 yet slightly.
Note that Case 1 is the best case scenario, where there is no
infiltration into C. In all the other cases, the proposed scheme
outperforms the classical scheme substantially. Even though
the best case scenario is relatively likely compared to the
other cases, on the average, the proposed scheme outperforms
the classical scheme also substantially and achieves 40%
enhancement in the performance.
Furthermore, in Fig. 4, we have plotted the time evolution of
the singular values of the normalized gain matrix Lk‖Lk‖ . Note
that the gain matrix Lk and the normalized gain matrix
Lk
‖Lk‖
leads to the same performance, while the normalized one is
preferred in Fig. 4 for better demonstration. We also note that
while Lk ∈ Rm×m, all the gain matrices have rank less than
m = 8, i.e., L1, . . . ,Ln−1 have rank 2 and the last stage gain
matrix Ln has rank 4.
Scenario 2 - Robustness Analysis. We examine the robust-
ness of the proposed scheme for inaccurate perception of the
underlying state transition statistics. To this end, we consider
the setup in Scenario 1; however, now S perceives the statistics
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Fig. 4: Singular values of the normalized gain matrix Lk‖Lk‖ .
Ln has rank 4 while all the others L1, . . . ,Ln−1 have rank 2.
TABLE III: Comparison of JˆS in terms of µ and µP.
Cases
Actual Accurate Perceived Inaccurate
Probabilities Perception Probabilities Perception
1 0.700 0.1 0.85 0.0
2 0.025 1.9 0.025 1.9
3 0.025 13.2 0.025 13.3
4 0.025 32.0 0.025 32.1
5 0.025 2.5 0.025 2.5
6 0.025 21.3 0.025 21.3
7 0.025 10.0 0.025 10.0
8 0.025 20.7 0 24.8
9 0.025 43.8 0 53.0
10 0.025 14.3 0 19.3
11 0.025 66.2 0 80.0
12 0.025 36.7 0 46.3
13 0.025 13.6 0 18.2
Average 7.0 Average 8.1
as tabulated in Table III. Particularly, S is not aware of the
attacker A2, and designs the secure sensor outputs accordingly
even though the actual underlying statistics are as in Scenario
1, which is also provided in Table III. We have observed
that the performance degrades due to inaccurate perception of
the statistics; however, the proposed scheme still outperforms
classical scheme, whose performance is tabulated in Table II,
in individual cases, Cases 2−13, and on the average. We note
that since, in the inaccurate perception of the statistics, Case
1 has relatively higher probability, i.e., 0.85 > 0.70, we have
observed slight improvement in the performance in that case.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed and addressed secure
sensor design problem for cyber-physical systems with linear
Gaussian dynamics against the advanced persistent threats
with quadratic control objectives. By designing sensor outputs
cautiously in advance, we have sought to minimize the damage
that can be caused by undetected target-specific threats. To
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this end, we have modeled the problem formally in a game-
theoretical setting. We have determined the optimal control
inputs for both friendly and adversarial objectives for given
linear sensor strategies. Then, we have provided an algorithm
to compute the optimal linear secure sensor strategies that lead
to the equilibrium. We note that without linearity assump-
tion on the sensor outputs, the problem entails non-classical
information model due to distinct objectives of the agents.
Furthermore, for general, e.g., nonlinear, sensor outputs, the
corresponding optimal control policies could not be unique
and could not even be expressed in closed form [17].
Some future directions of research on this topic include: •
Formulation of secure sensor design strategies when the sensor
has access to noisy observations, or for, e.g., robust control or
feedback stability of the systems. • Here, we have considered
the scenarios, where the attackers have perfect knowledge
about the underlying state recursion. Another interesting ex-
tension would be to analyze the scenarios, where the attackers
can only have partial knowledge. In such scenarios, intuitively,
sensor outputs could play relatively more powerful roles since,
without caution, sensors might help the attackers to recover the
unknown part of the system dynamics.
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